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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how the prospect of foreign retaliation affects the antidumping (AD) process
in the United States.  We separate the capacity for retaliation into two channels: (i) the capacity for foreign
government retaliation under the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT/WTO system, and (ii) the
capacity for foreign industry retaliation through reciprocal claims of dumping and the foreign pursuit of
AD duties in countries with AD regimes.  Using a nested logit framework and analyzing U.S. AD cases
between 1980 and 1998, we find significant empirical evidence consistent with the theory that U.S.
industry is influenced by the threat of reciprocal foreign ADDs in its decision of which foreign countries
to name in the initial AD petition, and that the U.S. AD authority's antidumping decisions are influenced
by the threat of foreign retaliation under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
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In the past decade, there has been a proliferation of countries adopting antidumping (AD) policies.
As documented by Prusa (2001), 29 countries ﬁled over 2000 AD cases from 1987-1997. These
ﬁgures represent triple the number of ﬁling countries and ﬁve times the AD petitions compared to
the 1980s, when the primary users of AD laws were Australia, Canada, the European Community,
and the United States. Proliferation of countries with AD laws also means an increased chance of
seeing AD wars and retaliatory AD duties breaking out between countries. Anecdotal evidence of this
certainly abounds. One important example is the ﬁling of Canadian antidumping cases against U.S.
steel products in the fall of 1992 and 1993, ostensibly in response to the initiation and subsequent
U.S. antidumping duties levied against Canadian steel products from investigations begun in June
1992. More formally, Prusa and Skeath (2001) examine worldwide patterns of AD use from 1980-1998
and ﬁnd evidence consistent with “tit-for-tat” retaliatory AD actions. These apparent examples of
retaliation and the rising use of antidumping laws have raised substantial concern that AD activity
may ultimately reverse many of the free trade gains of the GATT rounds.1
On the other hand, the rising threat of retaliatory AD actions may have an eventual dampening
eﬀect on AD activity, leading to some sort of “cold war” equilibrium. In other words, once other
countries have the ability to retaliate in kind, a country (or petitioning industry) may ﬁnd it no
longer to their beneﬁt to ﬁle antidumping cases. It may even ultimately mean that traditional users
of AD laws may not wish to enforce these laws as stringently as before. For example, Lindsey and
Ikenson (2001) document the rising incidence of worldwide AD activity against U.S. exporters and
recommend that U.S. policymakers consider the eﬀects of defending and promoting AD activity
within the context of the WTO when one considers the interests of all domestic producers, not just
those in import-competing sectors.
Retaliation as a mechanism toward free trade is not a new idea. For example, a common per-
ception is that the trade wars stemming from the U.S. implementation of the Smoot-Hawley tariﬀs
may have laid the foundation for the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT). Additionally,
the literature on trade negotiations has highlighted that the potential for countries to revert back
1Gallaway, Blonigen and Flynn (1999) report that the collective U.S. welfare cost of U.S. antidumping and coun-
tervailing duties are substantial enough to rank second only to the eﬀects of the Multiﬁber Arrangement in terms of
most costly U.S. trade protection programs.
1to higher tariﬀs (i.e., retaliation) serves as an important enforcement mechanism for achieving trade
protection reductions.2
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether threats of retaliation have had any measurable
dampening eﬀect on U.S. AD activity from 1980 through 1998. At ﬁrst glance, this may seem to be a
poor place to look for such dampening eﬀects from retaliation threats. Law changes in the late 1970’s
led to a blossoming of U.S. AD activity during this time period and the latter half of this period
(the 1990s) saw increased worldwide AD activity and evidence consistent with retaliation against
U.S. exporters, as noted above. There are two important responses to this concern. First, as noted
by Blonigen and Prusa (forthcoming), an important research question is why there are not more AD
petitions, given the relative ease with which domestic industries can obtain AD protection and the
possibilities for collusive outcomes even if petitions do not bring formal AD protection. U.S. AD
petitions often involve very speciﬁc and narrowly-deﬁned products and annual activity often involves
a very small portion (less than 5%) of even manufacturing activity. The threat of retaliation may
be one important answer to this research question. Second, although there is evidence consistent
with speciﬁc, nontrivial AD retaliation across countries, this in no way rules out the possibility of
substantial reduced activity in general, due to threats of retaliation. Finally, we note that while there
were only a few users of AD laws in the ﬁrst half of our sample besides the U.S., two of its main
trading partners, Canada and the E.C., were in this group of AD users, providing ample opportunities
for AD retaliation against U.S. AD actions.
We examine two main channels through which the threat of retaliation may dampen AD activity
in the U.S. The ﬁrst channel is through domestic industries which decide whether to initiate an AD
investigation. A straightforward model of reciprocal dumping across countries in a repeated game
setting (presented in Blonigen, 2000, and summarized in the Appendix of this paper) shows that
an industry is more likely to ﬁle an AD petition the greater the import penetration and the lower
its “exposure” to retaliation. The industry is more “exposed” to retaliation when the industry has
signiﬁcant exports to the same country it is petitioning against and when that country has AD
policies in place. Everything else equal, we should observe a lower probability of an AD ﬁling against
a country in our data when the domestic industry has such exposure to retaliation. The AD process
2Important papers in this literature include Maggi (1999), Bagwell and Staiger (1999), Grossman and Helpman
(1995) and Riezman (1991).
2aﬀords a unique opportunity to examine this in that the domestic industry, not the government
agencies, decides which countries are targeted (or named) in a petition.
The second channel through which the threat of retaliation may operate is at the level of the
government agencies that decide the AD cases. In the U.S., the U.S. Department of Commerce
(USDOC) determines whether dumping has occurred, and the U.S. International Trade Commission
(USITC) determines whether the domestic industry has been materially injured due to the import
sources that have been named in the AD petition. The decision to grant AD protection by these
agencies may be inﬂuenced by the possibility that such an aﬃrmative AD ruling leads to retaliation
by the foreign countries through the GATT/WTO trade dispute settlement mechanism.3 Since 1989,
over thirty such cases involving AD actions have been ﬁled under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, with eleven of these involving the U.S. as the defendant country.4 Just as with well-
known cases, such as the U.S.-E.U. cases in bananas and beef, adverse judgments by the WTO can
lead to compensation to the foreign country by allowing it to retaliate through the withdrawal of tariﬀ
concessions. Bown (2001a) presents a theoretical model that considers the misuse of AD procedures
under such a situation where recourse is available to the foreign country under the GATT/WTO
dispute settlement process.
Of course, a plaintiﬀ foreign country needs to have the capacity to retaliate should it win a
dispute settlement over a U.S. AD action, which would involve suﬃcient consumption of U.S. goods
3This rationale for retaliation threats requires that these agencies’ decisions are not completely determined by the
economic facts of the case, but that they also involve agency discretion. This assumption seems quite reasonable given
the work by Hansen (1990), Moore (1992), and Hansen and Prusa (1997) that clearly shows that political considerations
are important for understanding the pattern of U.S. AD decisions.
4Eleven independent examples of formal GATT/WTO trade disputes since 1989 in which the U.S. was a defendant
country in such an AD ‘trade dispute’ are Sweden v. U.S. over ‘Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Seamless Steel Hollow Products from Sweden,’ Mexico v. U.S. over ‘Anti-Dumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement
and Cement Clinker from Mexico,’ Norway v. U.S. over ‘Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic
Salmon,’ Korea v. U.S. ‘Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One
Megabit or Above from Korea,’ Korea v. U.S. over ‘Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea,’ Japan v. U.S. over ‘Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan,’ EC v. U.S. over ‘United States - Anti-dumping duties on Seamless pipe from Italy,’ India v. U.S.
‘Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate From India,’ EC v. U.S. over ‘Anti-Dumping Measures on
Imports of Solid Urea from the Former German Democratic Republic,’ Korea v. U.S. over ‘Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Colour Television Receivers from Korea,’ and Mexico v. U.S. over ‘Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding
Imports of Fresh or Chilled Tomatoes from Mexico’ (WTO 1995a and 2001).
3exported to their country. In an empirical study of formal GATT trade disputes, Bown (2000)
has found evidence to suggest that countries tend to implement various forms of “GATT-illegal”
protection against trading partners that are unable to credibly threaten substantial retaliation, as
measured by the consumption of the policy-implementing country’s exports by the aﬀected trading
partner. This observation on capacity to retaliate allows us to identify this second potential channel
of retaliation threat eﬀects in our sample. In particular, we expect that smaller U.S. export volumes
to a foreign country means a limited capacity to retaliate by that foreign country, and makes it more
likely U.S. agencies will rule aﬃrmatively on AD cases against such a country. Even more directly,
if a foreign country is not a member of the WTO, this channel of retaliation is obviously closed to
that country, making adverse U.S. AD decisions more likely.
To test our hypotheses concerning these two channels of retaliation we sample all U.S. AD cases
from 1980 through 1998 and use a nested logit framework that models the U.S. industries’ decisions
of which countries to name in the ﬁrst stage, and the U.S. government agencies’ AD decision in the
second stage. We ﬁnd substantial evidence of dampening eﬀects on AD activity from both channels
of retaliation threats. Our estimates suggest that U.S. petitioning industries are less likely to name
foreign countries in an AD petition for which there is higher exposure (in terms of U.S. exports to
countries with AD laws) to retaliation. Additionally, we ﬁnd that the U.S. government agencies are
more likely to rule aﬃrmatively when the named foreign country has a lower capacity to retaliate
through the WTO dispute settlement process.
In terms of economic implications, our results can thus be interpreted along two dimensions. First,
it appears that retaliation threats do lower AD activity when examining U.S. AD activity over the
past two decades. This suggests that proliferation of AD laws across countries may not necessarily
lead to more (and could lead to less) worldwide AD activity in the future. On the other hand, the
results point to a shortcoming in the rules of dispute settlement of the GATT/WTO system. Even
increased participation in the system is hampered by the fact that the ‘retaliation-as-compensation’
mechanism of dispute settlement is inherently biased against bilaterally “powerless” countries who
may not be equipped with the capacity to retaliate against a particular trading partner.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical speciﬁcation more
formally, the data sample, and a brief review of the theory underlying our hypotheses. Section 3 then
presents results from our base speciﬁcation of our empirical framework. Section 4 provides sensitivity
4analyses and a discussion of the economic signiﬁcance of our estimates. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Econometric Model and Data Construction
In lieu of a formal presentation of the theory describing how the prospect of foreign recourse to ADDs
and/or a GATT/WTO trade dispute can be seen to aﬀect the ADD decision process, the reader is
referred to the Appendix and Bown (2001a). The theoretical implications for each of these models
on the econometric framework and data construction will be discussed in more detail below.
2.1 The Nested-Logit Framework
In practice in the United States, the AD process is multi-staged, and there are other stages beyond
that which we consider here which have been analyzed in other contexts.5 However, the basic
decisions that we consider can be illustrated through a two-level tree, as in Figure 1. In the ﬁrst
stage of the tree, we take as exogenous the fact that the U.S. industry will initiate an AD petition
against someone. In this ﬁrst stage our focus rests on the U.S. industry’s decision of which foreign
countries it will ‘name’ versus which it will ‘not-name.’
The second stage of the model is the outcome stage, where the U.S. AD authority makes a ‘pos-
itive’ ‘negative’ decision with respect to the petition. Empirically, characterization of the outcome
phase is complicated by the fact that petitions can be withdrawn or settled at any point during the
AD investigation. Prusa (1991) suggests that 80-90% of withdrawn cases involve a settlement or some
type of agreement between the domestic and foreign industries, and Prusa (1992) provides empirical
evidence to suggest that the eﬀect of the settlement outcome on trade is at least as restrictive as the
impact of the imposition of duties. We assume that withdrawals that occur after one or more pre-
liminary determinations by the U.S. AD authorities (withdraw late) lead to private settlements and,
hence, ‘positive’ outcomes for the petitioners. On the other hand, cases which are withdrawn early in
the investigation, before either agency even made a preliminary ruling, were mainly cases where the
5For example, Hansen (1990) uses a two-staged nested logit framework in which in the ﬁrst stage she considers
the binary decision of all 4-digit SIC industries in the U.S. of whether or not to ﬁle a petition, and then in the last
stage she considers the decision of the ADD authority, given that a petition has been ﬁled. Prusa (1991) considers a
two-staged nested logit framework focusing on the withdrawal decision. His focus however, is not on retaliation, but
on the economic and political factors that inﬂuence the withdrawal of AD petitions.
5petitioners quickly realized that they would likely lose if the investigation continued and, hence, we
classify these as negative outcomes. Thus as our benchmark outcome, we deﬁne the USITC’s decision
as either ‘Negative’={Reject, Withdraw Early} or ‘Positive’={ADDs, Settle, Withdraw Late}.6 We
do consider alternatives to this speciﬁcation of the second stage decision variable, which we report
in Section 4 below.
In estimating the multi-staged decision tree, we employ a nested-logit analysis, as originally
proposed by McFadden (1978).7 Let i ∈ {Name, Not Name} index the industry’s ﬁrst stage decision,
and let j ∈ {Positive, Negative} index the AD authority’s second stage decision. We assume that
the probability that the ﬁnal outcome is alternative ij, Pij, can be written as the product of the
conditional probability Pj|i and the marginal probability Pi, where, for example, each probability is
of the binomial logit form
PPositive|Named =
eβX
1 + eβX (1)
PNegative|Named =
1
1 + eβX (2)
PName =
eαZ+θIName
1 + eαZ+θIName . (3)
In (1) and (2) β is the vector of parameters to be estimated that are associated with the second stage,
AD authority’s decision, and X is the matrix of second-stage covariates. In (3) α is the vector of
parameters to be estimated that are associated with the ﬁrst stage, U.S. industry’s country ‘naming’
decision, and Z is the matrix of ﬁrst-stage covariates. Also in (3), IName is the standard inclusive
value that the industry derives from choosing alternative i = Name which is deﬁned as
IName = log(eβX), (4)
and consequently, θ is the parameter to be estimated on the inclusive value, measuring the dissimi-
larity between the alternatives that the industry faces in its ‘naming’ decision.8
6This classiﬁcation is made by referring to the information released by the USITC in the Federal Register.
7Further details on the econometric theory behind the nested-logit framework can be found in McFadden (1981) or
Greene (2000).
8An estimate of θ which is not statistically diﬀerent from 1 would indicate no dissimilarity between alternatives, or
in other words, the nested logit could be collapsed into a simple multinomial logit framework.
6To estimate the model we will proceed sequentially, using maximum likelihood techniques. As
is customary, we work backward by ﬁrst estimating the second stage binary choice made by the
AD authority. We then proceed by calculating the inclusive value of (4) using the estimates for β
calculated in the ﬁrst step, before turning to the estimation of the industry’s ‘naming’ decision of the
ﬁrst stage.9 We then calculate the ﬁrst stage standard errors using the Murphy and Topel (1985)
covariance matrix correction for two-step maximum likelihood estimation, before calculating and
reporting the elasticities of interest.10
Before turning to the results of the estimation, we brieﬂy discuss some of the basics of the
underlying theory and motivate the explanatory variables of interest and data construction.
2.2 Explanatory Variables and Data Construction
In this section, we describe the data sample and standard control variables we use to estimate
each stage of the nested logit framework, beginning with the second-stage decision by the U.S. AD
authority. At the end of the section, we describe our focus variables that we include in each stage to
estimate the impact of potential foreign retaliation.
2.2.1 U.S. AD Authority’s Decision
The data sample for the U.S. AD authority’s decision in the second stage is based on U.S. AD cases
that were initiated and concluded from 1980 through 1998 for the import sources named in U.S.
AD petitions. The domestic industry in a U.S. AD petition is required to name ﬁrms from only
one country in each petition, thus the data set includes information identifying the unique parent
country of the foreign ﬁrm(s) named in the case, the year of the case, and the USITC’s ultimate
decision in the case. The decision variable at this stage is thus a binary choice indicating either that
the case outcome was ‘positive’ or ‘negative.’ In our sample of years, 645 decisions were made by
the U.S. AD authority, with 370 petitions ending in positive outcomes and 275 petitions ending in
9Such sequential estimation using limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) has been shown to provide
consistent estimates, though they are ineﬃcient. As illustrated in our results described below, however, such LIML
techniques are suﬃcient to provide us with convincing results as a ﬁrst step in this analysis.
10The calculation of the elasticities of interest is complicated, in the sense that each explanatory variable has a distinct
eﬀect on each alternative at each level of the nested logit tree. For a discussion, see, for example, Greene (2000). The
elasticities are calculated at the mean values of the data, most of which are reported in Table 1.
7negative outcomes.11
As control variables for this second-stage, AD authority decision, we include many of the economic
and political variables that other researchers (see, for example, Hansen and Prusa 1997) in the liter-
ature have shown inﬂuence the AD authority’s ultimate positive/negative decision. Such economic
variables are designed to capture the potential injury to the industry and include changes in industry
capacity utilization rates (C CAP) and industry employment (C EMP).12 Political variables often
used include the size of domestic industry as measured by industry employment (EMP), and the in-
dustry’s concentration ratio (CONC) which is designed to capture the ease with which the industry
can coordinate potential lobbying activity and avoid the free-rider problem. As a statutory control,
we include a dummy variable for cases which have been ‘cumulated’ (D CUMULATE), which are re-
lated cases involving the same domestic industry ﬁled against ﬁrms from diﬀerent foreign countries.13
Hansen and Prusa (1996) have shown that there is a signiﬁcantly increased probability that such
cases will be accepted when they are considered jointly. Finally, macroeconomic variables such as the
national unemployment rate (UNEMRATE) are also used to control for changes in economy-wide
inﬂuences.
The variables of international trade that are also typically included are the foreign country’s
share of U.S. industry imports (IMPSHARE) and the growth rate in the U.S. imports of the product
under investigation from the foreign country from the previous year (C IMP), which looks to capture
the potential for a surge in imports.14 Also typically included is the pre-petition U.S. industry
tariﬀ (TARIFF), suggesting that AD authority may be more willing to provide ADD protection to
industries that have already undertaken substantial liberalization.15
11Underlying this we have 248 formal USITC rejections, 285 cases resulting in the imposition of ADDs and 113
cases which were settled or withdrawn. Based on data limitations, we are also only able to include AD cases in the
manufacturing sector.
12In unreported results, we have also controlled for changes in domestic industry shipments, which seem to have
little inﬂuence.
13In 1984 the antidumping law in the U.S. was amended by Congress to require that the USITC cumulate imports
from countries involved in related petitions when making its injury determination.
14In unreported results we have also tried controlling for changes in import share in lieu of changes in the real value
of imports, and this too seems to have little inﬂuence.
15In addition to this explanation, Bown (2001b) has suggested that industries with low pre-existing tariﬀs may have
more to gain through a tariﬀ increase for terms of trade reasons.
82.2.2 U.S. Industry’s ‘Naming’ Decision
Consider next the ﬁrst stage decision of whether or not a ﬁrm from a particular foreign country is
‘named’ in a U.S. industry’s petition. For our sample, we obviously observe the import sources that
were named in the petition, but we must also determine the sample of countries that were “eligible”
to be named by the U.S. petitioning industry but which were not-named. To make this determination
we consult the data and the relevant rules for AD procedures. In the petitions that are ﬁled, the
U.S. industry reports the disaggregated, tariﬀ line codes for the products that it claims have been
dumped.16 We thus use the tariﬀ line codes reported by the petitioning industry to identify in the
data which countries were eligible to be named.17 Not all of the import sources are eligible to be
named in AD petitions, however, as many of them have exports to the U.S. that are too small to
satisfy the statute’s “non-negligibility” requirements, which we take as having a share of at least 3%
of the tariﬀ line imports of the product.18 Note, however, that in our sensitivity checks reported
in Section 4, we vary the criterion by which we determine a country as being eligible to ensure our
results are robust to reasonable changes to the eligibility requirements. For the estimation results
reported in Section 3, this approach toward creating a sample of import sources yields 2015 such
sources that are determined by the data as being eligible: the 645 petitions in which countries were
named, and then 1370 non-named countries.
Given the theory and AD statutes it is clear that the U.S. industry has an incentive to name more
countries, to increase the likelihood of passing the USITC’s injury test, due to the cumulation rule. In
addition, large increases from a particular source should more likely lead to an injury determination.
Thus, we include the foreign country’s share of U.S. industry imports (IMPSHARE) and the growth
rate in the U.S. imports of the product under investigation from the foreign country from the previous
year (C IMP) as control variables in the ﬁrst-stage naming decision.
16For the period 1980-88, this was generally reported as the 5 or 7 digit TSUSA import category whereas from
1989-1998 this was reported as the 8 or 10 digit HTS import category. These codes are reported in the USITC’s notice
published about the case in the Federal Register.
17One caveat is that this approach obviously cannot hope to capture is the idea that U.S. industry might be choosing
TSUSA or HTS categories with these biases already mind.
18Section 5.8 of the WTO’s Antidumping Code states, “[t]he volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded
as negligible if the volume of dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for less than 3 per cent
of imports of the like product in the importing Member...” (WTO 1995b).
92.2.3 The ‘Threat of Foreign Retaliation’ Variables
As stated, the primary contribution of our analysis is to focus on variables that are designed to
measure the impact of the threat of foreign retaliation on whether import sources are named by the
domestic ﬁrms and/or given positive AD decisions by the AD authorities. We focus on two possible
channels of retaliation threats that may have an impact on both stages (and decisions-makers) in the
AD process.
The ﬁrst channel we consider is the potential retaliatory threat through what we term the
GATT/WTO channel. As detailed by Bown (2001a), foreign countries will be better equipped
to eﬀectively threaten retaliation through the GATT/WTO dispute mechanism if (a) they receive
a large amount of U.S. exports so that they have adequate leverage to retaliate, and (b) they are
GATT/WTO members with experience as a plaintiﬀ in formal trade disputes. In order to proxy
for such a channel of retaliation, we construct a variable that interacts U.S. exports to a particular
foreign import source as a share of total U.S. yearly exports (US EXPSHARE) with an indicator
variable that takes a value of 1 if the foreign country has ever been the plaintiﬀ in a GATT/WTO
dispute against the U.S. (D USPLAINT).19
We surmise that this GATT/WTO channel of retaliation may be more of a concern for the AD
authority’s decision than the domestic industry decision for a couple of reasons. First, petitioning
ﬁrms may not care about such potential for retaliation because it could likely concern products outside
of the petitioners’ own industry.20 Second, the credibility of the AD authority’s decisions may be
adversely aﬀected as more dispute settlement procedures occur, giving them incentives to minimize
such events. Nevertheless, we include this proxy variable of retaliation through the GATT/WTO
channel in both stages of the AD process (industry naming and AD authority decision) and expect
a negative sign, indicating a lower likelihood to name import sources with higher retaliation threat,
everything else equal.
A second potential channel of retaliation is what we term the AD channel. The domestic country
may be worried about the potential for retaliatory AD actions on the part of the foreign import
19In sensitivity tests below, we consider other constructions of this proxy variable, including substitution of export
levels for export shares and substitution of an indicator variable of GATT/WTO plaintiﬀ experience against any
country rather than GATT/WTO plaintiﬀ against speciﬁcally the U.S. (D PLAINT).
20For example, in the well-known U.S.-E.U. beef hormone case, the U.S. retaliated against a wide array of products
not connected with beef.
10sources. As shown in the Appendix, this would require that U.S. ﬁrms had suﬃcient export exposure
in the foreign country and that the foreign import source had its own AD laws. The petitioning
ﬁrms and AD authorities could be worried about retaliation in the same subject product, or more
broadly about related associated products in the industry. We ﬁrst specify our proxy variable for
retaliation through the AD channel as the interaction between the export share to the foreign import
source in the subject 8-10 digit HTS product and an indicator of whether the foreign import source
country has active AD protection.21 In later estimates presented below, we then consider that AD
retaliation may occur beyond the speciﬁc subject product and use the relevant U.S. 4 digit SIC
industry export share to the foreign import source country interacted with an indicator of whether
the foreign import source country has active AD protection. This allows us to account for the idea
that multi-product ﬁrms in the U.S. may face the threat of reciprocal AD retaliation in products
outside of the more narrow, 10 digit HTS category, provided they are still within the same 4 digit
SIC industry classiﬁcation. While the GATT/WTO channel is likely a larger consideration for the
AD authorities decision in the second stage, it seems natural to think that the AD retaliation channel
will be a larger consideration for the petitioning ﬁrms’ decision of which import sources to name.
Finally note that Table 1 reports summary statistics for the covariates used in the estimation, as
well as the expected sign of the parameter estimates in the two stages, where the Stage 1 decision
is Y1 =‘Named’ and the Stage 2 decision is Y2 =‘Positive AD Decisions.’ We next turn to our
estimation results to examine the evidence for these hypotheses.
3 Estimation Results
For each speciﬁcation of the model we use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of interest,
which we then use to calculate the reported elasticities. In this section we consider Tables 2 and 3
which report our ﬁrst set of results from a nested logit model that estimates the relationship between
the covariates of interest and the choices of both (i) the U.S. AD authority (in its positive/negative
decision) and (ii) the petitioning industry (in its name/not-name decision), given the industry’s
expectation over the U.S. AD authority’s ultimate decision. The results of each stage of the two-
staged model are split up into two broad sections in each of the tables. The columns on the right-hand
21For 1980-1988, we use Schedule B exports instead of HTS exports. For concordance between TSUSA imports and
Schedule B exports, see the ﬁles of Feenstra (1996,1997).
11side indicate the results of the second-stage, AD authority’s decision, whereas the columns on the
left-hand side indicate the results of the ﬁrst-stage, industry ‘naming’ decision. Each fully estimated
model will give elasticity estimates that are reported in two columns per model.22 In each of the
tables, the cells of the relevant ‘threat of foreign retaliation’ variables are shaded to help focus
attention on the results of primary interest.
Model (1) in Table 2 presents our base model elasticity estimates. First, we note that in each of
the models estimated, our results yield elasticities on the industry control variables that are broadly
consistent with the results reported elsewhere in the literature.23 Industry variables such as the
change in the capacity utilization rate, the size of industry employment, and the steel dummy are all
of the expected sign and statistically signiﬁcant. This is also the case for the import market share
of the country named in the petition, the growth rate of imports from the named exporter from
the prior year, and the dummy variable included for cases which were cumulated. The signs and
magnitudes of these control variables remain quite stable through a variety of speciﬁcations that we
estimate and report below.
Consider next the estimates on the threat of foreign retaliation variables in model (1) in Table 2. In
the ﬁrst row is our interaction variable to estimate the eﬀect of the GATT/WTO retaliation channel.
For both the naming decision and the AD authority decision, the sign of the coeﬃcient is negative, as
expected. In other words, higher potential for foreign retaliation through the GATT/WTO dispute
settlement mechanism is estimated to lower the likelihood of a foreign source being named in a U.S.
AD petition and, if named, lowering the likelihood that it will result in a positive decision. However,
this eﬀect is largest and only statistically signiﬁcant for the AD authority decision, which accords
with our a priori expectations that the AD authority would be more concerned about potential
retaliation through this GATT/WTO channel than petitioning ﬁrms.
The third row of Table 2 gives the elasticity estimates for our interaction variable that proxies
for the threat of retaliation through the AD channel. This variable is negative, as expected, for
the naming decision, but of the wrong sign for the AD authority decision. For both stages it is
also statistically insigniﬁcant. So, at this point, the evidence for the AD channel is weak, though of
22For example, the two column (1)’s of Table 2 refer to the ﬁrst and second stage estimates of one complete model,
the two column (2)’s would refer to a second complete model, etc.
23For a comparison of the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the industry control variables, see for example Hansen
and Prusa (1996,1997).
12correct sign for the stage we would expect - the naming decision by the petitioners. Evidence for this
AD channel on the naming decision gets much stronger for alternative proxies as we discuss below.
One initial concern is that there is signiﬁcant collinearity between our proxy variables for the two
channels of potential retaliation. In model (2) in Table 2 we include only the AD channel variable
in the naming stage and only the GATT/WTO channel in the AD authority stage. As one would
expect, this leads to more precise estimates, resulting in statistically signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients
for the appropriate retaliation variable in each stage.
As mentioned earlier, there are alternative ways that one could plausibly construct these proxy
variables. First, we have used export shares rather than export levels to proxy for the U.S.’s exposure
to foreign retaliation. However, a high export share may not mean much exposure if export levels
are generally low. Thus, an alternative is to use export levels to proxy for retaliation exposure. The
problem with this is that there is no implicit normalization across products/industries as with export
shares that necessarily add up to 100 percent for each product/industry. A certain dollar value of
trade may be a high volume for one industry and low volume for another, depending on the average
size of ﬁrms in these industries. In model (3) in Table 2 we run a speciﬁcation where we use export
levels, rather than shares, to construct our retaliation channel variables. The results are consistent
with our export share results, but with standard errors that are somewhat larger.
There are also alternative variables that may also characterize experience and ability to use the
GATT/WTO channel for retaliation. Our results in Table 2 specify an indicator variable if the foreign
source country has previously been a plaintiﬀ against the U.S. in a GATT/WTO dispute. Weaker
criteria are whether the foreign source country has been a plaintiﬀ in any GATT/WTO dispute
(model 4) or is even a member of the GATT/WTO (model 5). In Table 3 we present estimates
when we specify our AD channel with these alternative indicators of foreign source country ability
to retaliate through GATT/WTO channels. In model (6) we simply drop all observations involving
China as the foreign country. Regardless of which speciﬁcation we use, we get results that are almost
quantitatively identical.
134 Further Sensitivity Analysis
There are three diﬀerent sets of further sensitivity analysis that we report here. First, we consider
alternative speciﬁcations to the second stage dependent variable, to ensure that our results are
robust to changes in the characterization of the AD authority’s positive/negative decision. Second,
we consider changes to the eligibility requirements identifying the ‘not-named’ countries. Finally,
we substitute industry level exports for the product level exports. Each will be described in detail
in turn, before we proceed to a brief characterization of the ‘economic signiﬁcance’ of our results in
Section 4.4.24
4.1 Alternative Formulations for the Second Stage Outcome Variable
Recall again, that the second stage dependent variable in Tables 2 and 3 was characterized as
‘Negative’ = {Reject, Withdraw Early} and ‘Positive’={ADDs, Settle, Withdraw Late}. In Table 4
we recategorize the second stage dependent variable to be ‘Positive’={Reject, Withdraw (either late
or early)} and ‘Positive’={ADDs, Settle}. Under this characterization, of the 645 second stage de-
cisions made by the U.S. AD authority, 345 petitions which were ‘positive’ and 300 petitions which
were ‘negative.’ In terms of the results, while the statistical signiﬁcance on the ﬁrst stage ‘threat of
foreign retaliation’ variables is a little weaker, the same general pattern of results arises.25
24In addition to the sensitivity analysis reported here, we have also checked the robustness of our results to diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of how one considers the E.U.. In the analysis presented here, we assume that given the common external
trade policy of the E.U., the ‘E.U.’ is the potential retaliatory threat, so thus we aggregate all AD petitions against
diﬀerent E.U.-member countries regarding the same product into one E.U. AD case. We characterize the outcome for
this case as the worst (from the E.U.’s countries’ perspectives) outcome of all subcases. For robustness checks, we have
considered speciﬁcations in which we (i) do not combine any E.U. observations, (ii) combine some E.U. observations
to allow for the possibility of one E.U. ‘named’ observation and one E.U. ‘non-named’ observation, and (iii) drop all
E.U. observations. The results are not signiﬁcantly altered by consideration of these alternatives, and thus to conserve
space we have not reported them here. They are available upon request from the authors.
25In unreported results available upon request from the authors, we have also considered speciﬁcations of the model
in which we characterize the second stage dependent variable as ‘Negative’={Reject} and ‘Positive’={ADDs, Settle,
Withdraw}. The results are consistent, in terms of the statistical signiﬁcance, with those reported in Table 2.
144.2 Alternative Eligibility Requirements for ‘Non-Named’ Countries
In the estimation results presented, we have broadly followed the GATT/WTO statute in determining
what countries were eligible to be named, but which were ‘not-named’ in the U.S. industry’s ﬁrst
stage decision. The criterion was that the foreign country had to have a share of the U.S.’s import
market of at least 3% of the products under investigation. In this section we check the sensitivity of
our results to a change in the eligibility deﬁnition, which we report in Table 5.
Model (10) of Table 5 illustrates the results under a more restrictive 5% import share cutoﬀ
for eligibility, model (11) illustrates the results under a less restrictive 1% import share cutoﬀ for
eligibility, and model (12) illustrates the results under a rule in which the import share cutoﬀ is
3% but we only consider observations in which there was an increase in the amount of the relevant
products being imported into the U.S. (i.e. C IMP > 0).26 An inspection of the results suggests no
substantial changes in the estimated elasticities on the ‘threat of foreign retaliation,’ variables.
4.3 Using Industry-Level Exports in lieu of Product-Level Exports
The threat of foreign retaliation through foreign recourse to reciprocal ADDs facing multi-product
U.S. ﬁrms may not be adequately captured by focusing only on exports within the same HTS product
category. AD channel retaliation may occur in other products produced by the ﬁrm. Thus, as another
robustness check, we consider a speciﬁcation in which we substitute the industry level 4 digit SIC
export variables in for the product level 8-10 digit HTS export variables that we have been considering
previously.
The results presented in Table 6 provide evidence that the AD channel retaliation threat does
extend beyond just the product subject to the U.S. AD action. As shown in the table, the AD
channel variables in the naming stage show generally larger elasticities that are statistically stronger
than those reported earlier using data connected with only the product subject to the U.S. AD action
(compare again with Table 2), and further strengthens our evidence for the dampening eﬀect of this
channel of retaliation.
26Note that this results in changes in the number of observations in the industry’s ‘naming’ decision to 1681, 2797
and 1790, respectively.
154.4 Economic Signiﬁcance
Given that we have established that the estimates of the elasticities of interest appear fairly robust
to subtle changes in the way we construct and aggregate the data, the next question of interest is
whether or not these results have economic signiﬁcance.
In Table 7 we report the results of an exercise in which we consider changes in the ‘threat of
foreign retaliation’ variables, and we calculate the relative change in the probability of a positive AD
decision by the U.S. AD authority and on the probability of the U.S. industry’s decision of ‘naming’ a
trading partner. The initial probabilities were determined from the mean values of the second-stage
data, and we consider changes determined by one standard deviation increases in the underlying
data on the variables of interest.27
For example, consider a one standard deviation increase in the size of the share of U.S. exports to
a country which has been a plaintiﬀ in a GATT/WTO trade dispute against the U.S. That is, for two
otherwise identical trading partners in the average case, the one which receives 13.8% (as opposed
to the mean of 5%) of U.S. exports will face an 10-12% lower probability that the AD authority
will make a positive AD decision.28 The probability diﬀerence is 3-4% when using the export levels
measure, as opposed to export shares.
Next consider a one standard deviation increase in the size of the share of the petitioning U.S.
industry’s 8-10 digit HTS product exports to a country which has an active AD statute. In this case,
for two otherwise identical trading partners in the average case, the one which receives 15.8% (as
opposed to the mean of 4.4%) of the petitioning U.S. industry exports will face an 11-13% lower
probability that it will be named in an AD petition.29 The probability diﬀerence is 3-6% when using
the export levels measure, as opposed to export shares.
Finally consider a one standard deviation increase in the size of the share of the petitioning U.S.
4 digit SIC industry’s exports to a country which has an active AD statute. In this case, for two
27Note that the results on economic signiﬁcance summarized here are generally taken from the models with the
statistically largest elasticity estimates and hence, are giving an upperbound eﬀect.
28For example, in model (2) the conditional probability of a positive AD decision at the means of the data was
58.1%. Ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation increase in the U.S. export share from the mean of 5.0% to 13.8%
causes the conditional probability of a positive AD decision to fall to 52.5%.
29For example, in model (2) the probability that a foreign country will be ‘named’ when evaluated at the means of
the data was 33.8%. Ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation increase in the product export share from the mean of
4.4% to 15.8% causes the probability that a foreign country will be named to fall to 29.5%.
16otherwise identical trading partners in the average case, the one which receives 15.0% (as opposed
to the mean of 4.8%) of the petitioning U.S. industry exports will face a 17-18% lower probability
that it will be named in an AD petition.30 The probability diﬀerence is 12% when using the export
levels measure, as opposed to export shares.
In summary, we ﬁnd economically meaningful dampening eﬀects from these potential channels
for retaliation, though they are by no means overwhelmingly large. These eﬀects are obviously
average eﬀects over our entire sample of years. An interesting question we address next is whether
these dampening eﬀects may be increasing in importance as AD activity and GATT/WTO dispute
settlement activity increase.
4.5 Growing Retaliation Threat Eﬀects?
The potential for retaliation has been growing over the past decade. As documented by Miranda et al.
(1998), Prusa (2001), and Lindsey and Ikenson (2001), the number of countries adopting and using
AD laws began to rise substantially in the early 1990s with a concomitant increase in the frequency
of AD cases against U.S. exporters. In addition, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process only
explicitly began to be used for AD matters in 1990, with the ﬁrst panel report resulting from a formal
AD-related dispute between the U.S. and Sweden over a U.S. steel AD duty (WTO 1995a).
Table 8 thus reports results where we interact our retaliation threat variables with dummy vari-
ables to allow for structural breaks with respect to each distinct retaliatory threat channel. Here we
allow for a structural break with respect to the GATT/WTO channel in 1990 and with respect to
the AD channel at 1993.31 With these breaks, the estimated elasticity increases by about 50% on
the GATT/WTO retaliation channel for the AD authority outcome, suggesting that the dampening
eﬀects on positive AD outcomes from this channel increased during the 1990-1998 period, as ex-
pected. Evidence for greater dampening eﬀects from the AD channel on the naming decision across
the two periods is much weaker. One possible explanation is that it takes time for U.S. ﬁrms to
realize greater threats of retaliation as other countries adopt AD laws. Alternatively, it may be that
the countries that are adopting AD laws in the 1990s (many of which are less-developed ones) may
30For example, in model (15) the probability that a foreign country will be ‘named’ when evaluated at the means of
the data was 34.4%. Ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation increase in the industry export share from the mean of
4.8% to 15.0% causes the probability that a foreign country will be named to fall to 28.7%.
31Alternative, nearby break years give qualitatively similar but less precise estimates than those reported here.
17not be ones where U.S. exporters have much export exposure.
On a ﬁnal note, there certainly may be other channels of retaliation that our estimates are not
capturing. One such channel may be retaliation through some other form of trade protection other
than AD duties. This alternative may not be that signiﬁcant in that many other forms of protection
can require more political and economic costs to obtain and are likely not WTO-legal.
Another way in which retaliation threats may be having dampening eﬀects on the AD process
which we are not examining is the decision by the U.S. ﬁrms to petition against any import source in
the ﬁrst place. To gather data on all import product line codes to estimate the likelihood of a U.S.
AD petition by these product codes and the eﬀect of retaliation threats on that decision is a daunting
task that we leave for future research eﬀorts. Not modeling these eﬀects in the current paper could
create sample selection bias in our current estimates. This sample selection bias would likely occur
because the domestic industry only petitions for product line codes where the threat of retaliation
is generally low across the import sources in that product code. Such a sample selection bias would
make it less likely to ﬁnd retaliation eﬀects in the steps of the AD process that we actually ﬁnd.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates how foreign retaliation threats aﬀected ﬁlings and outcomes of U.S. AD cases
from 1980 through 1998. We identify and investigate two diﬀerent channels through which the threat
of retaliation can aﬀect diﬀerent critical stages of the AD process, which we label the AD channel
and the GATT/WTO channel.
We ﬁnd evidence to suggest that U.S. industries are inﬂuenced by the threat of retaliation through
the AD channel. In particular, U.S. industry is less likely to initiate petitions against ﬁrms from
countries which have active AD provisions and to which the U.S. petitioning industry sends sizable
exports. This is consistent with the theory that the industry is concerned with the capacity of the
foreign ﬁrms to initiate AD investigations and retaliate with reciprocal ADDs.
We also ﬁnd evidence to suggest that the U.S. AD authority is inﬂuenced by the threat of
retaliation through the GATT/WTO channel. The U.S. AD authority tends to reject petitions
against ﬁrms from countries that have experience as a plaintiﬀ in GATT/WTO trade disputes against
the U.S. and to whom the U.S. sends sizable exports. This is consistent with the theory that the
18AD authority is using discretion when it is concerned with the capacity of GATT/WTO-sanctioned
foreign retaliation in a potential formal trade dispute.
As noted in the introduction, these dampening eﬀects are important and, perhaps counterintuitive
with respect to recent literature concerned that more countries are adopting and using AD laws in
the past decade. The dampening eﬀects we estimate are economically signiﬁcant, though obviously
not large enough to eliminate worldwide AD activity. However, there is some evidence that these
dampening eﬀects grow in magnitude in the latter half of our sample, as AD activity by non-users
and use of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process grew. Thus, increased AD ability across
countries and familiarity with the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process may ultimately help put
the brakes on AD use by traditional users, leading to more of a “cold war” equilibrium rather than
a larger conﬂagration of AD protectionism.
It is important to note that the magnitude of these dampening eﬀects depends on how balanced
retaliation threats are distributed across countries. Poorer, less-developed countries likely have more
limited abilities to retaliate because other countries have relatively little exports to these countries.
Such asymmetries may limit how much retaliation threats can dampen activity. However, if trade
ﬂows are symmetric enough, the possibility exists that a proliferation of AD activity across many
countries may push countries to signiﬁcantly limit or eliminate such AD laws within the WTO - the
ultimate dampening mechanism.
19Variable Deﬁnitions and Data Sources
• US EXP: Real (1992) value U.S. annual exports to the identiﬁed country. Data taken from
Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen (1997) and Feenstra (2000).
• US EXPSHARE: Ratio of U.S. annual exports to the identiﬁed country to U.S. total annual
exports. Data taken from Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen (1997) and Feenstra (2000).
• D GATT/WTO: Indicator if the foreign country is a GATT/WTO member at the time of
the case. Data available from the WTO’s website at http://www.wto.org/ .
• D USPLAINT: Indicator if the foreign country has ever been plaintiﬀ to a formal GATT/WTO
trade dispute ﬁled against the U.S. Data taken from Bown (2000).
• D PLAINT: Indicator if the foreign country has ever been plaintiﬀ to a formal GATT/WTO
dispute ﬁled against any country. Data taken from Bown (2000).
• IN EXP: Real (1992) value U.S. 4-digit SIC industry annual exports to the identiﬁed country.
Data taken from Feenstra (1997) and USITC (2001).
• IN EXPSHARE: Ratio of U.S. 4-digit SIC annual exports to the identiﬁed country to US4-
digit SIC total annual exports. Data taken from Feenstra (1997) and USITC (2001).
• PR EXP: Real (1992) value U.S. 8-10 digit HTS annual product exports to the identiﬁed coun-
try for 1989-98, and 5-7 digit Schedule B exports for 1980-88. Data taken from Feenstra (1997)
and USITC (2001).
• PR EXPSHARE: Ratio of U.S. 8-10 digit HTS annual exports to the identiﬁed country to
U.S. 8-10 digit HTS total annual exports for 1989-98, and 5-7 digit Schedule B exports for
1980-88. Data taken from Feenstra (1997) and USITC (2001).
• D FORAD: Indicator if the foreign country has an active AD statute. Data taken from
Miranda, Torres and Ruiz (1998).
• IMPSHARE: Ratio of annual U.S. HTS (8-10 digit for 1989-1998) or TSUSA (5-7 digit for
1980-1988) imports from the foreign country to the total annual U.S. HTS/TSUSA imports.
HTS/TSUSA tariﬀ line codes taken from Federal Register (various issues). U.S. HTS/TSUSA
import data taken from Feenstra (1996) and USITC (2001).
• C IMP: Growth rate in the real (1992) value of U.S. HTS/TSUSA imports from the foreign
country from the previous year. Data taken from Feenstra (1996) and USITC (2001).
• TARIFF: U.S. industry’s pre-investigation tariﬀ level. For 1980-88, the data is 4-digit SIC
average tariﬀ level obtained from Tom Prusa. For 1989 and after, the data is taken to be the
8 or 10 digit 1994 average HTS tariﬀ taken from USITC (2001).
• D CUMULATE: Indicator if a case was ‘cumulated.’ Data obtained from Tom Prusa.
• D STEEL: Indicator if the U.S. industry is in the steel sector.
20• CONC: Four ﬁrm concentration ratio. Data taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’,
Census of Manufactures, Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing.
• EMP: 4-digit SIC industry employment. Data taken from Bartelsman, Becker and Gray’s (2000)
NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database.
• C EMP: Yearly change in 4-digit SIC industry employment. Data taken from Bartelsman,
Becker and Gray’s (2000) NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database.
• C CAP: Yearly change in the 4-digit SIC industry capacity utilization rate. Data taken the
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Industrial Reports, Survey of Plant Capacity. ‘Practical
rate’ used for 1980-88, ‘full production rate’ used for 1989 and after (discontinuation of ‘practical
rate’ series).
• UNEMRATE: U.S. national unemployment rate, taken from the Economic Report of the
President.
• D PRE 1990: Indicator if the year of the case was before 1990.
• D POST 1989: Indicator if the year of the case was after 1989.
• D PRE 1993: Indicator if the year of the case was before 1993.
• D POST 1992: Indicator if the year of the case was after 1992.
21Appendix
This appendix summarizes the theoretical model in Blonigen (2000). Following Brander and
Krugman (1983), assume there are two countries, home and foreign with one ﬁrm in each country
producing the identical good, Q. The ﬁrms compete in quantities in both markets, and we denote
ﬁrms’ quantities as q
j
i, where i indexes the market (“h” for home and “f” for foreign) and j indexes
the ﬁrm (“h” or “f”). Price in the home and foreign markets are a function of the total quantity







f. Marginal cost for each ﬁrm is a constant, ci, where i = h,f. There are transport
costs of the “iceberg” type when a ﬁrm in one country sells its product in the other country, such
that it’s marginal cost for these cross-border transactions is ci/g, where 0 < g < 1. Given this
setup, the markets are segmented and each ﬁrm’s decision for its optimal quantity for one market is
independent of it’s optimal quantity choice for the other market. It also means that one can solve
separately for the Nash equilibrium quantities in each market.
We now extend this basic model to consider the occurrence of AD petitions in the two countries.
First, assume the ability of each ﬁrm to petition for an AD duty on its rival, τ, for a cost of K. Also,
assume that the probability of success of the AD petition is an increasing function of the ratio of the
importing ﬁrm’s quantity to the domestic ﬁrm’s quantity in the previous period, which is denoted by
φh(q
f
h/Qh) for the home market and φf(qh
f/Qf), where 0 ≤ φh(.) ≤ φf(.) ≤ 1. This functional form
of the AD duty probability is intended to reﬂect the injury determination in the AD investigation
since this is the main hurdle in real-life AD investigations. To allow for the possibility of retaliation
consider an inﬁnitely repeated two-stage game each period where the ﬁrms in each country play a
game in quantities in the ﬁrst stage and then each ﬁrm decides whether to ﬁle an AD petition or not.
If ﬁled, an AD duty, τ, with probability φi(.) comes into eﬀect the subsequent period. Consequently,
each period the ﬁrm has the decision to petition for AD protection, which (if successful) leads to an
AD duty, or to not petition for AD protection, which leads to no duty or the removal of a duty, if
one was in place in the previous period.
Given this repeated game, the strategy most commonly discussed to achieve a cooperative out-
come, whereby neither ﬁrm ﬁles and both avoid AD protection in their export market, is the trigger
(or grim) strategy. With such a strategy, we assume both ﬁrms begin by not petitioning and then
22choose to continue with that strategy unless the other ﬁrm ﬁles an AD petition, whereupon they
retaliate and ﬁle an AD petition every subsequent period. As is well-known, such a trigger strategy
can support a cooperative equilibrium only if the punishment is large enough for each ﬁrm that it
outweighs the gains from deviating. Focusing on the home ﬁrm without loss of generality because
of the symmetry of this model, this would imply that the home ﬁrm would not deviate from the
cooperative equilibrium by ﬁling for an AD petition, provided that in any given period (t),
δφh(·)(ˆ Πh
h − Π∗h
h ) − K <
X
t=2
δtφf(·)(Π∗h − ˆ Πh
f) (5)
where 0 < δ ≤ 1 denotes the discount factor, ˆ Πh
h is the home ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the home market when
it has an AD duty in place, Π∗h
h is the home ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the home market when it does not
have an AD duty in place, Π
∗f
h is the home ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the foreign market when there it does
not face an AD duty in the foreign market, and ˆ Π
f
h is the home ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the foreign market
when there it does face an AD duty in the foreign market. The lefthand side of (5) is the expected
gains in additional proﬁt the home ﬁrm can make in the home market from deviating in a current
period by ﬁling for AD protection that begins next period. The righthand side of (5) represents
the expected losses in proﬁts in the foreign market once the foreign ﬁrm retaliates by adopting the
strategy of always ﬁling for AD protection beginning in the following period. Thus, depending on
the parameters of the model, we have a simple setting where the threat of retaliation may matter for
whether we see AD petitions. In fact, the higher the expected loss from retaliation, the more likely
a cooperative outcome from use of strategies such as the grim strategy, and the less likely we are to
see AD petitions being ﬁled.
Given this model, we can examine alternative scenarios that generate predictions for the empirical
estimation. First, it is trivial to see that if the foreign country does not have AD laws in this game,
the threat of retaliation is zero. This means that the righthand side of (5) becomes zero, making it
more likely the home ﬁrm will petition for AD protection. Second, suppose AD laws are in place
in the foreign country and that with symmetric costs the ﬁrms are able to attain the cooperative
equilibrium via trigger strategies, such that the condition in (5) is satisﬁed for both ﬁrms; i.e., no
AD petitions are ﬁled in either market. Now suppose the home ﬁrm has a cost disadvantage where
ch > cf. This obviously alters optimal quantities and proﬁts so that the condition in (5) may or
may not hold. With respect to the home ﬁrm, their market share in both markets will go down.
23This means that the probability of a successful petition in the home market increases, while the
probability of a successful petition by the foreign ﬁrm against the home ﬁrm falls. Likewise, the
proﬁt gain from an AD duty goes up in the home market, while the proﬁt loss from facing an AD
duty in the foreign market goes down. These eﬀects all work toward making it more likely that the
condition in (5) is not satisﬁed, and the home ﬁrms deviates and ﬁles an AD petition. Intuitively, a
cost disadvantage raises the potential proﬁt gain of an AD duty in the home market for the home
ﬁrm, while lowering its exposure to retaliation (and proﬁt loss) in the foreign market.
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Figure 1: The Decision Tree of the U.S. AD Process, Given that a Petition Has Been Filed
27Table 1: Summary Statistics for some Covariates of the Two-Staged Model
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28Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Results: Estimated Elasticities in the Two-Staged Nested-Logit Model
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Notes:  (i) standard errors in parentheses 
 
(ii) ‡ and † indicate |t|>2 and 2>|t|>1.5, 
respectively, and the MLE is of the predicted 
sign.  
 
(iii) * the numbers reported for the inclusive 
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Notes:  (i) standard errors in parentheses 
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Notes:  (i) standard errors in parentheses 
 
(ii) ‡ and † indicate |t|>2 and 2>|t|>1.5, 
respectively, and the MLE is of the predicted 
sign.  
 
(iii) * the numbers reported for the inclusive 




645 645 645 
 




Stage 1 with Y1=1 is ‘Named’ 
 
 

























































































































































Notes:  (i) standard errors in parentheses 
 
(ii) ‡ and † indicate |t|>2 and 2>|t|>1.5, 
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sign.  
 
(iii) * the numbers reported for the inclusive 
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32Table 6: Estimated Elasticities with Industry Exports in lieu of Product Exports
 
 
Stage 1 with Y1=1 is ‘Named’ 
 
 






















---  0.193 
(0.15) 
---  US_EXP  
• D_USPLAINT 
















---  -0.677† 
(0.44) 
---  IN_EXP 
 • D_FORAD 




















































































































Notes:  (i) standard errors in parentheses 
 
(ii) ‡ and † indicate |t|>2 and 2>|t|>1.5, 
respectively, and the MLE is of the predicted 
sign.  
 
(iii) * the numbers reported for the inclusive 




645 645 645 
 






Change in Conditional Probability 
of a Positive AD Decision, given that 
the Country has been Named 
 
 
Increase in share of US exports to a trading partner 
who has been a plaintiff in a GATT/WTO dispute 










Increase in real US exports to a trading partners 
who has been a plaintiff in a GATT/WTO dispute 

















Increase in share of US industry petitioner’s 8-10 
digit HTS product exports to a trading partner 












Increase in real value of US industry petitioner’s 8-
10 digit HTS product exports to a trading partner 












Increase in share of US industry petitioner’s 4 digit 
SIC industry exports to a trading partner country 











Increase in real value of US industry petitioner’s 4 
digit SIC industry exports to a trading partner who 







    
 
Notes: Sample means in brackets 
(N) indicates based on model N, for example,
 (3) is based on specification (3) of Table 2 




Stage 1 with Y1=1 is ‘Named’ 
 
Stage 2 with Y2=1 is ‘Positive AD Decision’ 












































 • D_FORAD 
• D_PRE_1993 
---  -0.528‡ 
(0.22) 
IN_EXPSHARE 
 • D_FORAD 
--- --- 
IN_EXPSHARE 
 • D_FORAD 
• D_POST_1992 
---  -0.528 
(0.38) 
IN_EXPSHARE 




















































































Notes:    (i) standard errors in parentheses 
 
  (ii) ‡ and † indicate |t|>2 and 2>|t|>1.5, 
respectively, and the MLE is of the predicted 
sign.  
 
  (iii) * the numbers reported for the inclusive 
values are the parameter estimates and not 
elasticities. 
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